

Lecture 7: Imperfect Competition and Intra-Industry Trade

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International Trade

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Introduction

- **Neo-classical theories of international trade**

- *Free trade is nothing but the extension to the whole world of the regime of free competition* (Léon Walras).
- Explain trade of *different* goods between *different* countries because of differences in technology (Ricardo, Eaton & Kortum) or factor endowments (HOS/HOV).
- Gains from trade due to resource reallocation when economies specialize in comparative advantage goods


- **Limits**

- Cannot easily explain trade between *similar* countries
- Or require random comparative advantage as Eaton & Kortum

- **Imperfect competition trade theories**


- Explain intra-industry trade between similar countries : horizontally differentiated varieties, reduced market power
- Gains from trade due to more variety in consumption and lower markups

Geography of international trade



Source : UN ComTrade

Intra- vs inter-industry trade



Source : Brühlhart (2008). Share of intra-industry trade, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index $IT_i = 1 - \frac{|X_i - M_i|}{X_i + M_i}$. Industries are defined at the 3-digit (red) or 5-digit (blue) levels.

Intra- vs inter-industry trade

- **Inter-industry trade**

- Bilateral exchange of different goods
- Around 60% of world trade

- **Intra-industry trade**

- Bilateral trade in similar products
- Around 40% of world trade
- Heterogeneity across country pairs (eg 87% of bilateral trade between France and Germany)

- **Consequences**

- Poor empirical performance of HOS might be due to intra-industry trade flows
- Explaining intra-industry trade requires to introduce the imperfect substitutability between goods

⇒ **New Trade Theories**

The Krugman model

Scale Economies, Product Differentiation and the Pattern of Trade, *American Economic Review*, 1980

Ingredients

- **Economies of scale** (fixed cost of producing)
- **Monopolistic competition** (imperfect substitutability between varieties + free entry)
- **Iso-elastic preferences** (constant price elasticity + preference for diversity)
- **International trade cost** (iceberg cost)
- Welfare gains from trade :
 - Increased by the greater diversity offered to consumers (due to scale economies, countries produce different goods)
 - Dampened by international trade costs

Assumptions

- Two countries (Home and Foreign), one differentiated good (a continuum of varieties ω), one factor (labor)
- **Factor** : Perfectly mobile across firms, immobile across countries (w, w^*)
- **Countries** :
 - Similar in terms of their preferences, technology, productivity
 - Different in terms of their size : L and L^*
- **Imperfect competition**

Demand side

- Preferences :

$$C = \left(\int_0^n q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

$\sigma > 1$ elasticity of substitution between varieties

Limit : $\sigma \rightarrow \infty =$ Perfect competition

- Budget constraint :

$$\int_0^n p(\omega)q(\omega)d\omega \leq R = wL$$

- Optimum ▶ demand

$$q(\omega) = \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} C$$

where P is the ideal price index

$$P = \left(\int_0^n p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} < \int_0^n p(\omega) d\omega$$

Supply side

- **Production function** (Economies of scale)

$$l(q(\omega)) = f + \frac{q(\omega)}{\varphi}$$

φ labor productivity (assumed identical across firms and countries)

- **Program of the firm**

$$\begin{cases} \max_{p(\omega)} \left[p(\omega)q(\omega) - w \left(f + \frac{q(\omega)}{\varphi} \right) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } q(\omega) = \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} C \end{cases}$$

- **Optimal price**

$$p(\omega) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{\varphi}$$

Equilibrium in autarky

- **Equilibrium profit :**

$$\pi(\omega) \equiv p(\omega)q(\omega) - w \left(f + \frac{q(\omega)}{\varphi} \right) = w \left(\frac{q(\omega)}{(\sigma - 1)\varphi} - f \right)$$

- **Free entry**

$$\pi(\omega) = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad q(\omega) = (\sigma - 1)\varphi f, \quad \forall \omega$$

- **Labor market equilibrium**

$$n \left(f + \frac{q(\omega)}{\varphi} \right) = L \quad \Rightarrow \quad n = \frac{L}{\sigma f}$$

- **Price index**

$$P = p(\omega)n^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{\varphi} \left(\frac{L}{\sigma f} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Open-Economy Equilibrium

- **No transportation cost, free trade**
 - Integration amounts to increasing the size of the country ($L + L^*$)
 - Equilibrium mass of firms increased ($n + n^*$)
 - Welfare gains due to increased diversity

- **With trade costs**
 - Iceberg trade cost $\tau > 1$
 - Program of the firm :

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \max_{p^D(\omega), p^X(\omega)} \left[p^D(\omega)q^D(\omega) + p^X(\omega)q^X(\omega) - w \left(f + \frac{q^D(\omega) + \tau q^X(\omega)}{\varphi} \right) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } q^D(\omega) = \left(\frac{p^D(\omega)}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} C \\ \quad q^X(\omega) = \left(\frac{p^X(\omega)}{P^*} \right)^{-\sigma} C^* \end{array} \right.$$

Equilibrium in open economy

- **Segmentation**

$$p^D(\omega) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{\varphi} = p^D \quad \text{and} \quad p^X(\omega) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{\tau w}{\varphi} = \tau p^D$$

- **Equilibrium profit**

$$\pi(\omega) = w \left(\frac{q^D(\omega) + \tau q^X(\omega)}{(\sigma - 1)\varphi} - f \right)$$

- **Free entry**

$$q^D(\omega) + \tau q^X(\omega) = (\sigma - 1)\varphi f$$

- **Labor market equilibrium**

$$n = \frac{L}{\sigma f}$$

Number of firms unchanged. No pro-competitive effect


Welfare gains from trade

- No pro-competitive effects (constant mark-ups)
- Consumer utility : $C = \frac{wL}{P}$
- Price index

$$\begin{aligned} P &= \left(\int_0^n p^D(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega + \int_0^{n^*} p^{X^*}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\ &= \left(n (p^D)^{1-\sigma} + n^* (\tau p^{D^*})^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \\ &\leq P^a \end{aligned}$$

Welfare gains due to an increase in the diversity of products
(decreasing in trade costs)

Welfare gains



Equilibrium wages

- Trade balance

$$np^X q^X = n^* p^{X*} q^{X*}$$

⇒ Relative wages in equilibrium

$$\frac{w}{w^*} = \left(\frac{P}{P^*} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}} = \left(\frac{LW^{1-\sigma} + L^*(\tau W^*)^{1-\sigma}}{L(\tau W)^{1-\sigma} + L^*W^{*1-\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

- When $\tau = 0$, $w = w^*$
- When $\tau \rightarrow +\infty$, $\frac{w}{w^*} \rightarrow \left(\frac{L}{L^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{2\sigma-1}} > 1$
- In general, wages are higher in large markets. Those markets have greater labor demand because they minimize trade costs. Higher wages maintain trade balance.

A Variant with Pro-competitive Effects of Trade

- With CES demand, the price elasticity is constant and firms charge a constant markup over costs. Prices and markups are unchanged by trade.
- Consider a linear demand function e.g.

$$p(\omega) = \alpha - \gamma q(\omega) - \eta \int_0^n q(\omega) d\omega$$

where $\alpha > 0$, $\eta > 0$. $\gamma > 0$ captures love of variety.

- Optimal pricing still verifies :

$$p(\omega) = \frac{\sigma(p)}{\sigma(p) - 1} \frac{w}{\varphi}$$

- The price elasticity decreases with quantity and increases with price. Firms must charge lower markups (and prices) under free trade.
- Trade is **pro-competitive** and increases welfare by bringing prices closer to marginal costs (lower deadweight loss).

Specialization in the Helpman-Krugman model

Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade, Cambridge, MIT Press

Assumptions

- Two countries (Home and foreign), two sectors (X and Y), one factor of production (labor)
- **Countries** identical except in their size (L et L^*)
- **Preferences**

$$C = C_X^\mu C_Y^{1-\mu}$$

with C_X a CES aggregate

- **Technology in sector X** : Same as before

$$q(\omega) = q^D(\omega) + \tau q^X(\omega) = \left(\frac{p^D(\omega)}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{\mu w L}{P} + \tau \left(\frac{\tau p^D(\omega)}{P^*} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{\mu w^* L^*}{P^*}$$

- **Technology in sector Y** : Numeraire, linear technology, no trade cost

$$Y = L_Y \Rightarrow P_Y = P_Y^* = w = w^* = 1$$

Equilibrium in open economy

- Free entry

$$q(\omega) = q^*(\omega) = (\sigma - 1)\varphi f$$

$$\Leftrightarrow n(L^* - \tau^{1-\sigma}L) = n^*(L - \tau^{1-\sigma}L^*)$$


- Firms' location

$$s_n \equiv \frac{n}{n + n^*} = \begin{cases} 0, & s_L \leq \frac{\phi}{1+\phi} \\ \frac{s_L(1+\phi) - \phi}{1-\phi}, & s_L \in \left[\frac{\phi}{1+\phi}; \frac{1}{1+\phi} \right] \\ 1, & s_L \geq \frac{1}{1+\phi} \end{cases}$$

where $\phi \equiv \tau^{1-\sigma} \in [0, 1]$ and $s_L \equiv \frac{L}{L+L^*}$

- If Home is sufficiently large relative to Foreign all production of good X occurs there (“**Home Market Effect**”).

Specialization



- A fall in trade costs makes the Home Market Effect stronger : specialization occurs even with relatively similar countries.

Empirical evidence

Empirical predictions

- Bilateral trade


$$X_{ij} = n_i p_{ij} q_{ij} = n_i \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{\tau_{ij} w_i}{\varphi_i P_j} \right)^{1-\sigma} R_j$$

- Gravity equation

$$\begin{aligned} \ln X_{ij} = & \underbrace{\ln \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma}}_{\text{constant}} + \underbrace{\ln n_i + (1 - \sigma) \ln \frac{w_i}{\varphi_i}}_{i\text{-specific}} \\ & + \underbrace{\ln P_j^{\sigma-1} + \ln R_j}_{j\text{-specific}} + \underbrace{(1 - \sigma) \ln \tau_{ij}}_{\text{trade cost}} \end{aligned}$$

- The trade cost elasticity has a structural interpretation : $1 - \sigma$.

Trade between US states and Canadian regions




Source : Feenstra & Taylor (2011)

Gravity equation

	Dependent Variable : $\ln X_{ij}$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In Population i	0.799 ^a	0.823 ^a		1.185 ^a	1.191 ^a	
In GDP per capita i	1.072 ^a	1.110 ^a		1.272 ^a	1.265 ^a	
In Population j	0.723 ^a	0.740 ^a		0.896 ^a	0.900 ^a	
In GDP per capita j	1.058 ^a	1.092 ^a		0.920 ^a	0.912 ^a	
In Distance	-1.008 ^a	-0.838 ^a	-1.000 ^a	-1.511 ^a	-1.199 ^a	-1.619 ^a
Trade agreement		0.917 ^a	0.643 ^a		0.758 ^a	0.493 ^a
GATT/WTO		-0.011	0.038		0.306 ^a	0.811 ^a
Common money		1.470 ^a	1.460 ^a		-0.029	0.035
Common border		0.588 ^a	0.533 ^a		1.152 ^a	0.840 ^a
Common language		0.559 ^a	0.535 ^a		1.108 ^a	0.909 ^a
Colonial links		1.376 ^a	1.277 ^a		0.672 ^a	0.889 ^a
Year	1970	1970	1970	2006	2006	2006
Fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
# observations	9,035	9,035	9,035	16,936	16,936	16,936
R ²	0.583	0.607	0.710	0.631	0.649	0.741

Border-effect, within the EU



Source : Head & Mayer (2000)

Conclusion

'In this model there are none of the conventional reasons for trade ; but there will nevertheless be trade and gains from trade.' Krugman (1980).

- Countries trade imperfect substitutes because of imperfect competition, economies of scale and love of variety.
- Gains from trade due to increased diversity in consumption.
- Interesting implication : the 'home market effect'. Can be extended to study firm location (economic geography).
- Empirically the Krugman model explains intra-industry trade, especially between rich countries.
- But it fails to explain "zeros" in bilateral trade flows :
 - in the model all produced varieties are consumed by all countries
 - in reality about half of all country pairs display no aggregate trade flows, and an even higher share in disaggregated data

Appendix : Demand Functions

- Consumers solve :

$$\begin{cases} \max_{\{q(\omega)\}_{\omega \in [0,n]}} \left[\int_0^n q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \\ \text{s.t. } \int_0^n p(\omega)q(\omega)d\omega \leq R \end{cases}$$

- FOC with respect to ω (λ the Lagrange multiplier)

$$p(\omega)q(\omega) = C\lambda^{-\sigma}p(\omega)^{1-\sigma}$$

- Integrate over the continuum :

$$\int_0^n p(\omega)q(\omega)d\omega = C\lambda^{-\sigma} \int_0^n p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega$$

and

$$C = \left[\int_0^n q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} = C\lambda^{-\sigma} \left[\int_0^n p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

Demand functions

- Using $R = PC$ (definition of the ideal price index) :

$$P = \left[\int_0^n p(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

and

$$q(\omega) = \left(\frac{p(\omega)}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{R}{P}$$

◀ Back to assumptions